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I. BACKGROUND
A. An Overview of the Acts
In 1965, Congress took its first historical step towards the ideal of
universally accessible health care services with the enactment of the
Medicare' and Medicaid 2 programs. These programs are federally sub-
sidized health insurance programs administered by the Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration within the Department of Health and Human
Services.
* This article was written as part of a directed research project at the George
Washington University National Law Center, where the author is a candidate
for the Juris Doctor degree. Mr. Eugene Tillman, Esq. and Mr. Joel Hamme, Esq.
of Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Washington, D.C., supervised this research and
provided invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
I The Medicare Act is embodied in Title XVIII of the Social Security Amend-
ments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 98-97, 79 Stat. 291 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395-1395tt (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
2 Id. 79 Stat. 343 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396m (1982)).
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Under the Medicare statute, the federal government reimburses prov-
iders of medical services for care rendered to elderly or disabled patients,
subject to guidelines and limitations. The Medicare Act establishes the
costs allowed for reimbursement for services and authorizes the Secretary
of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to promulgate
regulations that further interpret the costs.3
Medicaid, on the other hand, provides health care for the indigent 4 and
is funded by both federal and state governments.5 States which elect to
participate in the Medicaid program use federal funds in combination
with state funds to reimburse providers for their medical services. The
programs may vary from state to state. While each program is designed
to meet the needs of the state,6 it must comply with federal guidelines.
Low income Medicare recipients may also qualify for Medicaid, in which
case Medicaid will pay the Medicare premium, copayment and deductible.
The Secretary of HHS contracts with fiscal intermediaries as agents to
assist in the administration of the programs.7 The intermediaries assist
providers in recording and reporting program costs and determining al-
lowable costs, and then distribute funds to the provider to cover the costs.
The intermediary is the first line of administrative authority for the
resolution of any type of Medicare dispute.8
B. The Medicare Prospective Payment System
In 1983, Congress enacted legislation establishing the Medicare Pro-
spective Payment System.9 This statute altered the conventional practice
of retroactive cost-based reimbursement of hospital costs by replacing it
342 U.S.C. § 1395hh (1982).
4The Medicaid asset limit is $2600 for individuals, $3,000 for two or more
people.
I The Medicaid program is a joint venture between the federal government and
participating states. When a state decides to participate, it must submit to DHHS
a satisfactory plan that meets the payment standards of the Boren Amendments.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A)(Supp. 1985).
6For example, the District of Columbia provides Medicaid benefits to an op-
tional classification of people known as the "medically needy." The medically
needy are people who would qualify for AFDC (AID to Families With Dependent
Children) or SSI (Supplemental Security Income) but for their excess income or
assets. Through an income adjustment process called "spend down," the medically
needy often qualify for Medicaid.7 An intermediary may be a "national, state ... public or private agency or
organization." 42 U.S.C. § 1395(a)(1982).
'42 U.S.C. §§ 405.1803(a), 405.1809(1986).
' Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983).
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with a reformed payment system. 10 Reimbursement alternatives were
initiated out of concern for the need to increase efficiency within the
health care delivery system." The new system provides for payment of
a predetermined amount for each discharged patient according to a clas-
sification system based on diagnostic related groups (DRGs).12 A hospital
receives a flat fee for treatment of a Medicare patient within a specific
diagnostic category regardless of the cost actually incurred or services
actually provided by the hospital. 13 Under this system a hospital that
incurs costs above the DRG payment rate will lose money.14 Conversely,
an efficiently run hospital capable of keeping costs below the DRG rate
will profit from the patient's treatment as it is permissible for the hospital
to pocket the reimbursement payment in excess of the cost of care.1 5
Consequently, this reimbursement system gives hospitals an incentive to
adhere to cost containment.
Medicare providers file an annual cost report with their assigned in-
termediary within three months of the end of the fiscal year. 6 The in-
10 Congress initially gave hospitals and physicians almost complete autonomy
to structure both their payment methodology and payment levels. The only con-
straint imposed on the Social Security Act of 1965 was that the payment level
be "reasonable" and the services provided be "necessary" for the treatment of
illness or injury. See Kinney, The Medicare Appeals System for Coverage and
Payment Disputes: Achieving Fairness in a Time of Constraint, 1 ADmIN. L. J. 1-
15 (citing Social Security Act § 1815, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (Supp. III 1985)).
With the new system, reimbursement for inpatient services is no longer based
on the costs incurred by the hospital. However, reimbursement for psychiatric
hospitals, nursing homes, outpatient services, capital expenses, bad debt and
medical education is still based on the cost reporting system. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395ww(a)(4), (d)(1)(B)(Supp. III 1985).
Medicare reimbursement to nursing homes is still based on reasonable costs
and is retroactive. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f(b)(1), (v)(11)(A)(1988); 42 C.F.R. § 413.9(1990). Providers are reimbursed by using the interim rates of the last year.
Reimbursement rules and the facilities Medicare utilization rate are used by the
intermediaries to establish the total amount of reimbursement owed the nursing
home. The interim rates are then adjusted either upward or downward to reflect
the final reimbursement due. 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(1988).
11 See Sharkey & Buckle, The Medicare Prospective Payment System: Impact
on the Frail Elderly and an Alternative Reimbursement Formula, 3 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POLY 227 (1988).
12 The DRG classification scheme has twenty-three major diagnostic categories
(MDCs), each of which corresponds to a major body system. The MDCs, in turn,
are subdivided into 467 DRGs. Three additional DRGs were established for cases
which require clarification or correction of hospital records. See Preamble to
Interim Final Rule, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,752,760 (1983).
11 A "DRG weight" is assigned to each DRG category and multiplied by a
"standardized amount," based on the average allowable cost in treating all DRGs
to determine the reimbursement to the hospital. Thallner, Prospective Payment
System: Preclusion of Review of Hospital Base Year Cost Calculations, 6 J. LEGAL
MED. 509, 516 (1985).
14 Vladeck, Medical Hospital Payments by DRGs, 100 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
576 (1984).
'a Id.
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(1)(1988).
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termediary will audit the report and issue a Notice of Program
Reimbursement (NPR).17 A provider who is dissatisfied with the reim-
bursement may request administrative review of the claim or later bring
suit in federal court.
The Provider Reimbursement Review Board (Board)18 is a forum for
the review of intermediary reimbursement decisions and adjudication of
disputes between providers, who are dissatisfied with the amount of reim-
bursement or its timeliness, and their intermediaries. 19 There is an appeal
mechanism for the disputes and judicial review is available once the Board
has exercised its jurisdiction over the appeal. 20 Because the inability to
gain administrative review precludes later judicial review of a provider's
claim, denial of jurisdiction at this level often becomes a critical issue.21
C. The Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act
Prior to October 1, 1981, hospital Medicaid reimbursement was based
on a "reasonable cost" standard.22 In 1980, Congress enacted the Boren
Amendment 23 which changed the federal standard for reimbursement
rates for nursing and intermediate care facilities and provided for both
more stringent cost containment and less federal oversight of state reim-
bursement methodologies. In 1981, Congress expanded the new standard
to include hospital reimbursement rates when it enacted the Omnibus
17 Id.
11 See S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 249 (1972). The Board was created
by Congress in 1972 and is composed of five members appointed by the Secretary.
Each member has knowledge of the field of reimbursement. Two of the members
represent the Provider. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(h) (1988).9 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(1), (d) (1988). Intermediaries are required to send
providers a final determination within a reasonable time (12 months) after filing
a cost report. Id.; a provider who wishes to challenge the intermediary with respect
to the NPR may appeal to the board. If the amount in controversy is more than
$1,000 but no greater than $10,000, the provider may request a hearing before
an intermediary hearing officer within 180 days of receipt of the NPR. 42 C.F.R.
§§ 405.1811(a), 405.1809(b)(2)(1989).
2o See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo (1988); 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1809, § 405.1835 (1989)(provides for Providers Reimbursement Review Board hearings, Medicare Part
A disputes, and judicial review for cases involving $10,000 or more, or for group
appeals amounting to at least $50,000); see 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff; see 42 C.F.R.
§ 405.801 (1989) (provides the appeal mechanism and judicial review for Medicare
Part B disputes).
21 The jurisdiction and authority of the Board become a major issue if a provider
has not initially presented a claim for reimbursement of particular costs to the
fiscal intermediary. The Board may then lack statutory power to exercise juris-
diction over the appeal.
22 Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 237 (1968) (payment should not exceed reasonable costs
consistent with efficiency, economy and quality of care); Pub. L. No. 92-603, Title
11 (1972) (payment for long term care services paid by states under medicaid on
a "reasonable cost-related basis"); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(E)(1976) (standard
from 1972-1980 required reimbursement on a "reasonable cost related basis").
Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 962(d) (1980).
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Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA).2 4 Currently, a state plan for Medicaid
reimbursement must provide:
for payment ... which the State finds, and makes assurances
satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to
meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and eco-
nomically operated facilities in order to provide care and serv-
ices in conformity with applicable State and Federal laws .... 15
The shift from reimbursement of all "reasonable costs" to reimburse-
ment of those "reasonable and adequate costs" permitted states to alter
their plans to encourage cost containment and cope with reductions in
funds available to the states from the federal government under the
Medicaid program.2 6 Congressional intent was to grant greater flexibility
to develop state Medicaid methods of payment for services.2 7
This paper reviews various challenges to state Medicaid reimbursement
plans brought by providers of Medicaid services. It is not intended to be
a comprehensive summary of the issues.
II. A PROVIDER'S CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
REIMBURSEMENT PLANS
A. The Supremacy Clause
A provider's challenge to a state reimbursement plan based on the
supremacy clause28 derives from the requirement that once a state elects
to participate in the voluntary Medicaid program, it must comply with
federal statutory requirements. 29 The Boren Amendment regulations es-
tablish the controlling guideline for Health Care Financing Administra-
tion (HCFA) review of state reimbursement plans.3 0 The success of this
argument is contingent upon a showing that the state statute fails to
comply with the standards set forth in the Boren Amendment. The statute
would then be void as a result of the supremacy clause.
In Wisconsin Hospital Association v. Reivitz, 1 the plaintiff, a Wisconsin
24Pub. L. No. 97-35 (1981).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(13)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
26 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(s)(1)(A), (t) (Supp. V. 1981).
27 J.L. HAMME & S.R. KANNER, LONG TERM CARE REIMBURSEMENT ISSUES: PRO
AND CONTRA AIDS FOR LITIGANTS, in 1989 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 87, 89 (1989)
(relying on STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., SPEND-
ING REDUCTIONS RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE 44-45
(Comm. Print 1980)); S. REP. No. 471, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, 29 (1979).
2' U.S. CONsT. art. VI.
29Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980).
30 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.200-447.280; 52 Fed. Reg. 28,141-48 (July 28, 1987).
(Final Regulatory Amendments).
31 No. 82-C-1055, slip op. (E.D. Wis. Jan. 11, 1983), reported in [1983-1 Transfer
Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) para. 32,380 (E.D. Wis. 1983), rev'd
& remanded, 733 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1984), opinion on remand, 630 F. Supp. 1015
(E.D. Wis. 1986), affd in part, vacated in part & remanded, 820 F.2d 863 (7th
Cir. 1987).
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not-for-profit corporation and three individual general care hospitals in
Wisconsin, alleged that a Wisconsin rate freeze under a reasonable reim-
bursement plan denied them an inflationary rate increase in conflict with
federal regulations, and thus was void as a result of the supremacy clause.
The district court held that the Wisconsin provision freezing Medicaid
rates for three months was a violation of the "reasonable and adequate"
standard and, therefore, unconstitutional. The state had made assurances
to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) that its reim-
bursement rates granted an inflationary rate increase to providers based
on an increase for a federally defined hospital "market basket." The ra-
tionale behind the court's decision was that the state could not simul-
taneously assure HHS that its plan comports with federal "reasonable
and adequate standards" while supporting the position that a freeze which
ignores inflation continues to be "reasonable and adequate."
On appeal, the seventh circuit criticized the lower court's holding that
a rate freeze is inherently unreasonable because of its arbitrariness in
ignoring inflationary increases. 32 The case the district court had relied
on in making its determination, Wisconsin Hospital Association v.
Schmidt,33 involved a rate freeze of an indeterminate length of time,
unlike the freeze at issue which was to last only three months. In addition,
the district court failed to take into account the new standard instituted
under the Boren Amendment. The Boren Amendment illustrates a
congressional concern for cost containment which would not be furthered
by a simple cost-plus adjustment. Because the record lacked the technical
data required to evaluate the individual effects of this rate freeze in order
to determine whether the reasonable and adequate standard was met,
the seventh circuit remanded the case for further consideration. 34
On remand,35 the court relied on testimony and evidence concerning
the freeze's impact on the provider hospital to determine whether the
freeze constituted a "material or significant change" requiring adherence
to federal regulatory procedure.36 Data provided at trial included a study
comparing the interim rates for the year preceding the freeze with the
interim rates for the year of the freeze. The study found that the freeze
would decrease Medicaid interim rates for inpatient service by 2.136
million or 1.773 percent. Additional testimony established that the reim-
bursement rate for the three month period was actually 2.6 percent less
than the actual rate of inflation and intensity for hospitals during that
12 Wis. Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, 733 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1984)
- Case No. 75-C-382, slip op. (E.D. Wis. Apr. 28, 1976).
34Wis. Hosp. Ass'n, 733 F.2d at 1234.
31 Wis. Hosp. Ass'n, 630 F. Supp. at 1015.
16 Id. at 1021. Under 45 C.F.R. § 205.5(a) (1989) "[i]f a state makes a 'material
change in any phase of State law,' it must amend the State Plan." The Secretary
must approve a state plan amendment for it to be effective. 45 C.F.R. § 201.3
(1989). Under 42 C.F.R. § 447.256(b)(2) (1987) the state must submit assurances
to the Secretary for a "significant change" in the methods and standards for
determining the rate for Medicaid reimbursement.
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period.3 7 The court found that the failure of the state to account for the
actual increase in the inflation rate when coupled with the decrease in
reimbursement for inpatient and outpatient services due to the freeze,
rendered a "material change" in state law and a "significant change" in
state methods for determining Medicaid reimbursement rates-, Because
the states failed to submit assurances as required under the regulations,
the freeze legislation was held void. 39
Similarly, in Hillhaven Corporation v. Wisconsin Department of Health
and Social Services,40 the district court determined that a three month
rate freeze produced a significant change in state reimbursement meth-
odology for nursing homes. The freeze decreased the reimbursement rates
more than one percent and provided that the 1982 rates would be effective
for fifteen months where federal law required redetermination of rates
annually. Again, the state failed to provide the requisite assurances with
respect to the modification of the rates thus rendering invalid the modified
rates and the state statute which established them.41
1. Prior Review of State Plan Modifications by HHS
One element in determining whether an amended state plan complies
with federal criteria, and thus would not violate the supremacy clause,
is its prior review by the Secretary of HHS. Scrutiny by the Secretary
informs the court of the reasonableness and adequacy of the amended
state plan under the federal criteria. The Secretary's determination is
not necessarily final as it is subject to judicial review. But the court in
the Reivitz case, noted that a prior determination would be particularly
appropriate where the issue involves application of the reasonableness
standard to a highly technical subject outside the conventional compe-
tence of the courts. 42
17 See J.L. HAMME & S.R. KANNER, supra note 27, at 101 ("Some states have
attempted to curtail rates by reducing or limiting inflation factors in their rate
methodologies. Instances when accepted inflationary indices do not support such
limitations, they have generally been invalidated.").
38 Wis. Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, 630 F. Supp. 1015, 1023 (E.D. Wis. 1986), affd
in part, vacated in part & remanded, 820 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1987).
39Id.
40 Case No. 83-C-0016, slip op. (E.D. Wis. May 7, 1986) reported in MEDICARE
& MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) para. 35,498 (1986).
41 Id. at para. 11,617.
42See Wis. Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, 733 F.2d 1226, 1235 (7th Cir. 1984), opinion
on remand, 630 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Wis. 1986), affd in part, vacated in part &
remanded, 820 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1987). In contrast, the Secretary's role of review
of reimbursement plans was described as one of "oversight only" in Illinois Health
Care Ass'n v. Suter, 719 F. Supp. 1419 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that no private
right of action exists against the Secretary of HHS under the Medicaid Act).
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In Reivitz, the state did not submit assurances to HHS reflecting a three
month freeze because it contended that the change was not a "significant
change." Under prior regulations, any change expected to increase or
decrease Medicaid payment by one percent or more during a twelve month
period following the effective date of the change was considered "signif-
icant" enough to trigger the public notice requirements. 43 The court in
Reivitz found the 1.8 percent change "significant" but did not establish
a threshold percent change at which submission of assurance and public
notice would be required.44 The state of Michigan, in Coalition of Michigan
Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Dempsey,45 submitted assurances and followed
public notice requirements when a change in the state plan resulted in
less than a one percent decrease in the average daily reimbursement rate.
Michigan, however, maintained that it was not required by law to do so.
Federal regulations do not define the terms "material" or "significant"
and few decisions involving the 1981 amendments have litigated the issue
of what constitutes a "significant change."
B. Challenges Under the Equal Protection, Due Process and
Contract Clauses
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "no state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."45 Falling within the constitutional definition
of "persons" are corporations, such as nursing homes and hospitals. Con-
sequently, such corporations frequently challenge state reimbursement
plans as resulting in unequal treatment under the law.
In the Hillhaven case,47 Wisconsin's three month freeze of nursing home
reimbursement rates violated federal Medicaid provisions. These provi-
sions prohibited significant changes in payment policies without assur-
ances that resulting rates would be reasonable and adequate and pro-
hibited less than reasonable and adequate rates in response to budgetary
limits. Plaintiffs also successfully pursued a direct equal protection chal-
lenge of a recoupment provision within the state plan that denied capital-
cost adjustments for Hillhaven Corporation while adjustments were
granted to other nursing homes similarly situated.48 Plaintiffs argued
- 42 C.F.R. § 447.252(a) (1987) (assurances as to reasonableness and adequacy
must be provided when the state makes "significant changes in its methods and
standards for determining payment rates"); 42 C.F.R. § 447.252(b) (1987) (requires
that the agency must submit "detailed information concerning the impact of
changes on different types of services," but the criterion with respect to "signif-
icant" change does not apply to this section); 42 C.F.R. § 447.205(a) (1987) (public
notice requirement triggered by a significant change which "is expected to in-
crease or decrease Medicaid payments for service by one percent or more").
820 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1987).
537 F. Supp. 451,459-60,463-64 (E.D. Mich. 1982). But see Coalition of Mich.
Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Dempsey, 537 F. Supp. 451,463 (1982) (reduction resulting
in less than a one percent decrease in the average daily reimbursement rate is
not a "significant" change under the flexible standards of the Boren Amendments).
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
47 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) para. 35,498 (1986).
Id. at para. 11,618-19.
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that all other providers which had acquired existing nursing homes, at
or about the same time as plaintiffs completed their acquisition, received
a capital allowance adjustment in accordance with a 1981-82 Method of
Implementation Plan.49 Plaintiffs never received such an adjustment.
Because the Method of Implementation from 1983 based a facility's capital
cost reimbursement on its capital allowances as of 1983, plaintiffs' sub-
sequent adjustments were never appropriate. 50
Defendant based its position on a recoupment provision that provided
that all capital cost adjustments allowed in the first three months of 1983
in connection with changes of ownership occurring during the last six
months of 1982 were subject to recoupment under a six month formula.
Therefore, the defendant maintained that the possibility of recovering
the capital cost increases from the other providers placed all providers
in the same position as the Hillhaven Corporation. The court noted, how-
ever, that the state, even if the recoupment were enforced, would only
recover rate increases paid to other providers for the first three months
of 1983, and this would not affect the increases paid to providers after
that period. Therefore, the capital allowances adjustment received by
other providers had a continuing (positive) effect on their reimbursement
rates to date which the recoupment provision would not reverse. The
court held that the different treatment accorded plaintiffs denied them
equal protection of the laws. The defendant was ordered to recompute the
plaintiffs' 1983 capital allowances for facilities acquired in 1982 and to
use that recalculated allowance as the base rate for plaintiffs' current
capital allowances. 51
Defendant's contention that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit
because they operated their nursing homes through subsidiary corpora-
tions which were separate legal entities won only criticism by the court.
The critical fact was that defendant's actions caused substantial monetary
damage to the plaintiffs' corporation itself.52
On the other hand, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Highland Cha-
teau, Inc. v. Minnesota Department of Public Welfare,'53 affirmed a sum-
mary judgment against a nursing home's equal protection challenge when
the home attempted to circumvent Minnesota's equalization law by hav-
ing a portion of its facility "decertified" from the Medicaid program. Under
the equalization law, a limit was set on the amount by which private
rates could exceed Medicaid reimbursement rates. The nursing home
attempted to decertify a portion of the facility in order to charge higher
rates to patients in the decertified portion of the facility.54
Highland challenged the economic and social welfare classification cre-
ated by the rate equalization laws as a violation of the equal protection
clause. Highland contended that defendant's enforcement of the law sub-
4 9
/d.
50 Id.
Id. at para. 11,623.
"Id. at para. 11,622-23 (relying on Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
5 356 N.W. 2d 804 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), reported in MEDICARE & MEDICAID
GUIDE (CCH) para. 34,200 (1984).
'4Id. at para. 10,362.
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jected nursing home residents to disparate treatment.55 Specifically at-
tacked was the discontinuance of a waiver policy which permitted
noncomplying nursing homes to continue to be reimbursed for a period
of time because there was a concern that patients would be uprooted if
the home was required to comply immediately with the equalization law.
When it became apparent that the waiver policy was preventing the
equalization law from taking affect, the defendant discontinued the policy.
Because an economic or social welfare classification can not be set aside
under the equal protection clause unless it is shown to lack a rational or
reasonable basis, no violation of the rights of the residents was found.56
Effectively, the equalization law constituted an attempt to minimize dis-
parate treatment of residents because of economic class.
A similar equal protection argument failed to sway the eighth circuit
in the case of Minnesota Association of Health Care u. Minnesota De-
partment of Public Welfare57 which involved a challenge to the same equal-
ization law. Under the rational basis test, the court found that the statute
promoted the legitimate state interest of controlling rates charged by
Medicaid participating homes to residents not receiving medical assis-
tance.58 Plaintiff argued that an inequity resulted because the statute
was limited to nursing homes participating in the Medicaid program even
though the rationale for the statute applied to other providers as well.
The court noted that the rate discrepancy the statute was designed to
check would not exist in nursing homes occupied only by private paying
residents. 59 The Minnesota legislature could rationally have concluded
that only discrepancies in charges by Medicaid participating nursing
homes presented grave economic and personal harm to consumers and,
therefore, only this class required regulation. A state legislature may
deal with the most serious aspects of a problem consistent with equal
protection principles, and it may select only one phase of a business
activity to regulate and neglect all others.6° Thus, the eighth circuit held
that the classifications were neither invidious nor arbitrary and, hence,
not violative of equal protection.6'
In the same case, under a due process clause challenge, Minnesota
Association of Health Care Facilities (MAHCF) contended that by lim-
iting the rates charged to residents not receiving medical assistance, the
Minnesota statute, together with an inadequate level of reimbursement
to nursing homes for care of medical assistance recipients, deprived Min-
nesota nursing homes of substantive due process. This resulted in a taking
of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.62 In constructing the argument, MAHCF suggested
"Id. at para. 10,365.
'Id.
57 742 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1984).
58 Id. at 447-48.
59 Id.
10 Id. at 448 (relying on Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,489 (1955)).
61 Id.
12 Id. at 446 (relying on Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public
Service Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 690 (1923)).
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that the court treat nursing homes and public utilities similarly with
respect to state rate regulation. Public utility rates which are not suffi-
cient to yield a reasonable return on the value of the property used have
been held to be a deprivation of a utility company's property.63 The eighth
circuit distinguished nursing homes from public utility companies and
declined to apply the public utility standard to the case. Nursing homes,
unlike utility companies, have the freedom to decide whether to remain
in business, and any participation in a Medicaid program is voluntary.
The court reasoned that this voluntariness effectively foreclosed the pos-
sibility that the statute could result in an imposed taking of private
property, giving rise to a constitutional right ofjust compensation., Sim-
ilarly, in the Highland case, the fact that medical assistance participation
was voluntary, foreclosed the possibility of a due process violation.6 5
In both the Highland case and the MAHCF case, plaintiffs argued that
the Minnesota Statute § 256B.48(1)(a) impaired the obligation of the
contracts clause in violation of Art. I, § 10 of the United States Consti-
tution by making compliance with its terms a condition of Medicaid par-
ticipation. The gist of the argument in both cases was that the statute
altered the terms of agreements reached with private residents by lim-
iting rates a nursing home could charge non-Medicaid patients. The
eighth circuit applied the three part test of Energy Reserves Group, Inc.
v. Karras Power and Light Co.,6 6 and concluded that even if the impair-
ment of the contract was substantial, the state's interest in controlling
rates charged by nursing homes provided a legitimate public purpose for
the statute. Ensuring that state subsidy of medical assistance residents
did not work to the detriment of private paying residents was a legitimate
exercise of police power. Therefore, prospective application of the statute
was constitutional.6 7
However, the portion of the statute which retroactively required res-
titution of charges in excess of a differential was held invalid in the
MAHCF case because it caused a substantial impairment of contracts. 68
The rates charged were not unlawful at the time they were collected, and
nursing homes could reasonably have expected that they were entitled
to these funds. In addition, this part of the statute had a considerably
narrower focus and was found to disrupt settled and completed financial
arrangements.
3 Id.
64Id.
"MEDICARE & MEDICAID GuIDE (CCH) para. 34,200 (1984).
459 U.S. 400, 410 (1983) (The test to determine whether a law has uncon-
stitutionally impaired a contract is: (1) whether the impairment is substantial;
(2) whether the challenged regulation promotes a significant and legitimate public
purpose; and (3) whether the regulation is a reasonable exercise of the State's
police power); see also MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) para. 34,2000 (1984);
see also Minn. Ass'n of Health Care v. Minn. Dept. of Public Welfare, 742 F.2d
442, 449 (8th Cir. 1984).6 7 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) para 34,200 (1984); Minn. Ass'n of
Health Care, 742 F.2d at 450.
6 Minn. Ass'n of Health Care, 742 F.2d at 451.
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C. Eleventh Amendment as a Bar to Suit
The Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted as barring suits in
federal court against a nonconsenting state brought by its own citizens,
as well as those suits brought by citizens of another state 69 The Supreme
Court established a line of demarcation between suits which seek pro-
spective injunctive relief and those which seek retroactive monetary
awards. When a plaintiff sues a state official for a violation of federal
law, a federal court may award injunctive relief which governs the future
conduct of state officials but not retroactive monetary damages.7 0 The
court's reasoning is that prospective relief is a remedy designed to end a
continuing violation of federal law and is necessary to vindicate federal
interest in assuring the supremacy of that law. But compensatory or
deterrence interests are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Elev-
enth Amendment.
71
The states generally will assert that the suit is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment if the relief sought is retroactive in nature. However, the
sovereign immunity afforded by the amendment is not absolute.72 If a
state waives immunity and consents to suit "by most express language
or by such overwhelming implications from the text as leave no room for
any other reasonable construction," the Eleventh Amendment bar is re-
moved.73
In the Amisub case,74 the tenth circuit dismissed the state as a named
defendant in the suit. The state's silence on the issue of waiver and
participation in the suit did not constitute an "effective waiver" under
the Edelman standard.75 Under Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,7
Congress must express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
in "unmistakable language" in the statute itself. The tenth circuit found
no such language within the Medicaid Act.
Although defendants will generally try to characterize all requested
relief as retroactive in nature, the court may nonetheless grant relief if
it finds plaintiff's request not entirely retroactive. In the Reivitz case, 77
a question arose as to whether the state's legal obligation to reimburse
the plaintiff hospital for services rendered, accrued upon the services
performed or upon final settlement. If the legal obligation did not accrue
'9Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974).
70 Id. at 678; Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)
(reaffirming the holding of Edelman).
11 See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
72 See Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. State of Colo. DSS, 879 F.2d 789, 792 (10th Cir.
1989).
71415 U.S. at 673 (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171
(1909)).
14Amisub, 879 F.2d at 792.
75 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
70 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
77 630 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Wis. 1986).
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until final settlement (as of yet unperformed), the Eleventh Amendment
did not bar recovery. The court found that the incurrence of the legal
obligation was the pertinent event, not its subsequent transformation at
final settlement into a finite sum. 78 Based on Daubert v. Percy,79 the dis-
trict court determined that the Eleventh Amendment should not preclude
recovery of monetary relief for funds unpaid because of the freeze. The
court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred recovery only up to the
date when defendants were enjoined from implementing the freeze.80 If
the seventh circuit had upheld the district court's prior decision to enjoin
the freeze, the relief requested would have been prospective in nature.8'
A similar Eleventh Amendment argument was presented in the Hill-
haven case.8 2 The issue was whether an order invalidating the rate freeze
constituted retroactive relief barred under the Eleventh Amendment as
interpreted in Edelman, or whether such relief was designed to end a
continuing violation of federal law and, thus, prospective in nature as
interpreted in Green v. Mansour.8 3 The plaintiff argued that the holding
of Daubert should control. A 1983 injunction placed the state on notice
that the three month freeze was enacted in violation of federal law and
that the state would in all likelihood be required to reimburse plaintiff
based on an increased capital allowance. The court distinguished the
Daubert and Reivitz cases from the case at bar because in those cases the
state either knew what the anticipated payments would be or the pay-
ments were ascertainable and spanned a limited time period. 4 The state,
in Hillhaven, however, had no way to determine the additional reim-
bursement payments for which it might be held liable.8 5 The state had
never determined with certainty what capital allowance adjustment the
plaintiff would be entitled to or what formula to use in its calculation. 6
Thus, although plaintiff's requested relief was found to be not entirely
retrospective in nature, award of monetary damages was denied.87 The
court stated that such an award would exceed the Daubert rule and violate
the Eleventh Amendment.
71 Id. at 1020.
79 713 F.2d 328, 329-30 (7th Cir. 1983). In Daubert, funds should have been
paid to the plaintiff pursuant to a prospective injunction but were withheld be-
cause the injunction was erroneously modified. The seventh circuit affirmed the
district court's ruling that these funds were not retroactive in nature, and thus
the award was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id.
'o See Id.
81 Id. at 1021. Due to particular facts of the Reivitz case, plaintiffs did not
recover any monetary damages because the freeze affected a period preceding the
court's order and not thereafter.
82 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) para. 35,498 (1986).
See 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985) (claim
seeking declaration that an official's prior conduct in violation of federal law was
retroactive relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
" Hillhaven Corp. v. Wis. Dept. of Health and Social Services, No. 83-C-0016,
slip op. (E.D. Wis. May 7, 1986) reported in MEDICARE & MEDICAID GuIDE (CCH)
para. 35, 498 (1986).
95Id.
-Id.
67 Id.
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An Eleventh Amendment defense will not religiously foreclose recovery
of retroactive funds. Providers may in some cases be successful in re-
covering funds retroactively in a state forum.M Also, an Eleventh Amend-
ment defense may not completely defeat a jurisdiction where a
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order is sought.8 9
III. PROVIDERS' CHALLENGES UNDER THE FEDERAL STANDARD
A. Zone of Reasonableness
The Boren Amendment requires that reimbursement plans be "rea-
sonable and adequate to meet the costs that must be incurred by efficiently
and economically operated facilities. 90 The Supreme Court, in the context
of utility rate setting, supports a "zone of reasonableness" doctrine in
interpreting the statutory reasonableness standard:
[t]here is no single cost-recovery rate, but a zone of reasona-
bleness: statutory reasonableness is an abstract quality rep-
resented by an area rather than a pinpoint. It allows a
substantial spread between what is unreasonable because too
low and what is unreasonable because too high.9'
Consequently, in the Reivitz case, the seventh circuit, though limited by
an inadequate record on review, predicted that Wisconsin's rate increase
and resulting rates as modified by a limited three month freeze would
have fallen within a zone of reasonableness and adequacy.92 Thus, in
asserting a challenge to a rates adequacy and reasonableness, a provider
must establish its substantial negative impact.
B. Federal Court Standard of Review
In review of state Medicaid plans, the federal courts must determine
whether the plan is procedurally and substantively in compliance with
8 See Coalition of Mich. Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Dempsey, 537 F. Supp. 451,
464 (E.D. Mich. 1982); see Hillhaven Corp. v. Wis. DHSS, 733 F.2d 1224, 1226(7th Cir. 1984) (Wisconsin state Medicaid plan provided an appeals mechanism
by which plaintiff could recover retroactive payment).
J.L. HAMME & S.R. KANNER, supra note 27, at 99.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1987).
91 Federal Power Comm'n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976) (relying on
Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246
(1951)).
733 F.2d 1226, 1233 (despite probable "reasonableness and adequacy," the
freeze was held to violate federal regulations because the state failed to submit
assurances and comply with public notice requirements).
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the federal Medicaid Act and its implementing regulations. The tenth
circuit in the Amisub case explained that the court must not limit its
analysis to whether the nonadjudicatory agency findings are arbitrary
and capricious. 93 The first step in the analysis is to determine whether
payment under the plan resulted in noncompliance with federal statute
and regulations. This issue is subject to de novo review in federal court
and no deference is accorded the state agency's determination of compli-
ance with federal law. Once the requirements have been met, the court
must defer to the state agency unless it has acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously.
In contrast, the third circuit's ruling on the substantive scope of review
in regards to the adequacy of rates stressed a deferential approach in its
use of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard to determine whether fed-
eral statutory requirements have been met:94
We believe that this scheme also contemplates deferential
standard of review by the courts in assessing compliance with
the 'reasonable and adequate' requirement of section
1396a(a)(13)(A). Applying a higher standard would run counter
to the congressional intent that states be accorded considerable
freedom in pursuing ways of limiting Medicaid costs and en-
couraging efficiency.9
5
Even under this narrow scope of review the court invalidated Pennsyl-
vania's Medicaid reimbursement methodology for out-of-state hospitals
because the state agency was unable to demonstrate a rational basis for
its differing treatment of the hospitals.9 6
C. Submission of Balanced Assurances and Findings by the State
Procedural claims may be raised by providers if the state, when chang-
ing its Medicaid rate methodology, either failed to submit a plan amend-
ment to HCFA or sought to implement the plan earlier than permitted
under federal regulationsY The state agency is required to submit ade-
quate assurances and related information to the federal government when
93Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. Colo. DSS, 879 F.2d 789, 795-96 (10th Cir. 1989); see
also Colo. Health Care Ass'n v. Colo. DSS, 842 F.2d 1158, 1165 (10th Cir. 1988).
94See W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 701 F. Supp. 496 (M.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 885 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1989), pet. for cert. pending, 58
U.S.L.W. 3430 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1989) (No. 89-994).
W. Va. Univ. Hosp., 885 F.2d 11 at 23-24.
Id. at 29.
7 See 42 C.F.R. § 447.256(c)(1987); see 45 C.F.R. §§ 201.3, 205.5 (1989); see
Wis. Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, No. 82-C-1055, slip op. (E.D. Wis. Jan. 11, 1983),
reported in [1983 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) para.
32,380, rev'd and remanded, 733 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1984), opinion on remand,
630 F. Supp. 1015, 1021-23 (E.D. Wis. 1986), affd in part, vacated in part and
remanded, 820 F.2d 863, 868-69 (7th Cir. 1987).
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seeking to amend its rate methodology.98
In California Hospital Association v. Schweiker,99 assurances given by
the state with respect to the reasonableness and adequacy of the proposed
rates were not based on a balanced objective view of the data. Instead,
the state based the findings on a best case scenario, considering only those
factors favorable to the State Plan Amendment and intentionally ex-
cluding and failing to consider equally relevant unfavorable factors.
Implementation of the plan was permanently enjoined until the State
Department of Health Services could consider all relevant factors to de-
termine whether the reasonableness standard was met.
In Nebraska Health Care Association v. Dunning,00 the claim was that
the underlying data base provided inadequate support for the state's
assurances, and that the state failed to perform the objective studies
necessary for reasoned rate-making. The state had assured HCFA of nurs-
ing home payment at the 65th percentile ranking of nursing homes' al-
lowable costs."" The law, however, imposed a 3.75 percent limit on
increases in payment, making this assurance impossible to implement.10 2
Payment would be below the 65th percentile (rate deemed sufficient by
HCFA to enable efficiently run facilities to participate in Medicaid) and
would force facilities to reduce their services to Medicaid patients.' 3 The
failure of the state to satisfy the requirements of federal regulations when
the plan was submitted was a sufficient basis for the eighth circuit to
affirm the district court's judgment enjoining the plan. 04
A recent decision, Pinnacle Nursing Home v. Axelrod, suggests that the
courts may be leaning towards a stricter review of state assurances.' 0 In
this case, the district court of New York compared the federal regulations
governing submission of assurances (42 C.F.R. § 447.253(b)) with New
York state's assurances and concluded that "[t]he assurances are patently
and painfully insufficient, constituting nothing more than a formalistic
recitation of the federally mandated requirements of the Medicaid
Plan."'0 6 The court invalidated New York's 1987 amendment to the plan
due to the procedural insufficiency of the agency's findings and assur-
ance. 1
0 7
98 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.250-.272 (1987). (The State Medicaid Agency must
engage in a "finding" process that all federal requirements have been met to
substantiate assurances. It must also supply HCFA with "assurances" that all
federal requirements have been met, including the "efficiency and economy" re-
quirement.).
" 559 F. Supp. 110, 117 (C.D. Cal. 1982), affd, 705 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1983).
101 No. CV82-L-472 (D. Neb. July 9, 1984), reported in [1984-2 Transfer Binder]
MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) para. 34, 100 (D. Neb.), affd in part and
vacated in part on other grounds, 778 F.2d 1291, 1296 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1063 (1987).
101 Id.
102 Id.
1'0 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) para. 34,100.
104 778 F.2d at 1294.
105 719 F. Supp. 1173 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
106 Id. at 1179-89.
107 Id.; see also J.L. HAMME, Long-Term Care Reimbursement Issues, in 1990
HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK (1990).
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D. Effect of the State Plan on the Quality of Patient
Care and Access to Services
A crucial factor in challenging a state rate reduction is its adverse
impact on the quality of care and/or patient access to services. Pertinent
support for the challenge may be provided by evidence that the rates
cause grave financial loss to the facility, resulting in curtailment of serv-
ices to patients.108 Also of significance is whether the altered rates result
in a greater degree of private patient subsidization of Medicaid patients
or a decrease in acceptance of Medicaid patients to the facility.109
In Cascade County Convalescent Nursing Home v. Department of Social
and Rehabilitation Services," ° the court considered four factors in deter-
mining whether the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if a prelim-
inary injunction were not issued. First, plaintiffs needed to show that
facilities were required to reduce nurses aids and housekeeping staff with
a resulting increase in patient falls."' Second, that a reduction in staff
levels would violate licensure and certification requirements and would
cause a freeze of admission levels and close of certain floors.12 Third, that
private pay rates would have to be increased to compensate for decreased
Medicaid rates."' Finally, the plaintiffs needed to show that fixed con-
tractual obligations would be affected.1 4 Harm to patients resulting from
the reduction also tipped the balance of hardship strongly in plaintiffs'
favor. The court granted the preliminary injunction concluding that pub-
lic interest could only be served so long as facilities received a level of
reimbursement sufficient to render adequate care to patients."5
E. Compliance of Overall Medicaid Rate with Federal Standard
Some cases have suggested that the main issue in Boren Amendment
litigation is whether the overall Medicaid rate, rather than an isolated
component of the rate, is reasonable and adequate to reimburse the costs
of efficiently and economically operated facilities. In Colorado Health Care
"O J. L. HAMME & S.R. KANNER, supra note 27, at 102-03.
09 Id.
"I No. CDV-83-867, slip op. (8th Jud. D. Mont. Aug. 30, 1984), reported in [1986
Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) para. 34, 810.
"I Id. at para. 9075-78; see also Neb. Health Care Ass'n v. Dunning, 578 F.
Supp. 543, 545 (D. Neb. 1983) (preliminary injunction granted when "threat of
irreparable harm is genuine" because the rate reduction was found to result in
the inability of providers to furnish the "nature of services contemplated by the
federal program").
11 Cascade County Convalescent Nursing Home v. Dept. of Social and Reha-
bilitation Serv., No. CDV-83-867, slip op. (8th Jud. D. Mont. Aug. 30, 1984),
reported in [1986 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) para.
34,810.
113 Id.
114 Id.
... [1986 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) para. 34,810.
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Association v. Colorado Department of Social Services, the tenth circuit
held that the state can terminate one component of reimbursement even
if only for budgetary reasons, as long as the overall payment complies
with statutory requirements. 116 The central issue in this case was whether
the state's decision to eliminate payment of an incentive allowance re-
sulted in a violation of the Medicaid standards."' Under Colorado's plan,
if a nursing home's actual costs were below the ninetieth percentile, an
incentive allowance was added to the reimbursement rate."8 The state
eliminated the incentive payment plan because of a projected $24 million
shortage in Medicaid funds. Appellant providers argued that the district
court dismissed the case in error because the eliminated incentive factor
resulted in a reduction in providers' overall payment effectuated solely
for budgetary concerns." 9 Therefore, the incentive factor was unlawful
despite the Secretary's approval of the state's action. 120 The court found
that the state had considered relevant factors including some forty dif-
ferent options for cutting program costs so that a rational relation existed
between the factors and the state's conclusion that the incentive payment
should be terminated. The argument that the state is precluded from
reducing payments solely on the basis of budgetary appropriations has
been rejected by the courts. 121 The elimination of the incentive factor
resulted in payment based on allowable costs incurred, limited only by
the ninetieth percentile ceiling. As the courts have found rates below the
ninetieth percentile to be in compliance with federal standards, the tenth
circuit found no basis for holding that the ninetieth percentile ceiling
violated statutory requirements and affirmed the district court's dis-
missal. 22
In contrast to the scenario in Colorado Health Care Association (CHCA),
when a state agency bases its findings solely on budgetary constraints,
as in the Amisub (PSL) case, the court is likely to find no reasonable
basis for assurances made to the HCFA. 23 In Amisub (PSL), the tenth
circuit distinguished its prior position in the CHCA case by noting that
116 842 F.2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1988); see also Wis. Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, 733 F.2d
1226, 1233 (7th Cir. 1984), opinion on remand, 630 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Wis. 1986),
affd in part, vacated in part & remanded, 820 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1987) (prior
medicaid reimbursement rate is not per se the only reasonable and adequate
rate).
117 Colo. Health Care Ass'n v. Colo. DSS, 842 F.2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1988).
118 Id. at 1162. Reimbursement was calculated as follows: Actual costs (limited
by statute) + incentive allowance (if actual cost below ninetieth percentile) +
inflation factor (based on consumer price index) = PPD (Per Patient rate paid
Daily to service provider). Id.
119 Id.
120Id.
121 Coalition of Mich. Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Dempsey, 537 F. Supp. 451, 463
(E.D. Mich. 1982).
-2 See Miss. Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 701 F.2d 511, 517-18 (5th Cir. 1983) (eigh-
tieth percentile); cf. Neb. Health Care Ass'n v. Dunning, No. CV 82-L-472, slip
op. (D.C. Neb. July 4, 1984) (sixty-fifth percentile in compliance until state sub-
sequently imposed pro rata cut).
- Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. Colo. DSS, 879 F.2d 789, 800-01 (10th Cir. 1989).
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CHCA had considered elements in addition to budget constraints in its
decision to eliminate incentive payments, including forty cost cutting
options, relevant cost and data factors, and the "efficient and economic"
standard.12 While a state agency is entitled to rely on budget constraints
in setting payment rates, these alone are never a sufficient basis upon
which to amend a current plan, implement a new plan, or make annual
mandatory findings. 125 In Amisub, appellants' contention was that pay-
ment rates were arbitrary and capricious as a result of the application
of a budget adjustment factor (BAF). Although applicants of the factor
resulting in a forty-six percent reduction in provider reimbursement was
held to violate Medicaid law, the tenth circuit was careful to caution
against foreclosing its future use. "[So long as the resulting [overall]
provider rates comply with federal law," use of a BAF is not prohibited
under this decision. 126
F. Providers' Right to Sue Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 provides a remedy under color of state law for deprivation
of "any rights.., secured by the Constitution and laws."' 27 The Supreme
Court interpreted this language in the case of Maine v. Thiboutot'28 as
referring not only to equal rights laws and constitutional violations, but
generally to all federal statutory law. One of the chief defenses brought
in Boren Amendment litigation is that a provider may not maintain a
private right of action against a state official under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Virginia Hospital Association v.
Bailes, to decide the question of whether providers may use Section 1983
to enforce reimbursement provisions of the Medicaid Act against state
officials.'2 9 A Supreme Court ruling in Virginia Hospital that providers
lack a private means of enforcing reimbursement provisions against state
officials would severely limit enforcement of the Boren Amendment
through private suits in federal court although judicial review of state
administrative proceedings would remain available. 130 Absent the right
of providers to bring suit, a federal court could not issue retroactive
damages against a state because of the Eleventh Amendment bar.13 '
However, the third, fourth and tenth circuits,'3 2 under similar analyses,
124 Id. at 800.
'1
2 Id. at 800-01.
128 Id. at 801.
127 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
12 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
129 868 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 49 (1989).
10 See J.L. HAMME, supra note 107.
131 See prior discussion in section II C of text.
132 W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 701 F. Supp. 496 (M.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 885 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1989); cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1294
(1990); Va. Hospital, 868 F.2d at 653; Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. Colo. DSS, 879 F.2d
789 (10th Cir. 1989) (in complete accord with the analysis used by the fourth
circuit); Coos Bay Care Center v. Or., 803 F.2d 1060 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted
481 U.S. 1036 (1987), vacated as moot, 484 U.S. 806 (1987) (allowed health prov-
iders to challenge state medicaid plans under section 1983 because they considered
the interests of health providers and medicaid patients to be "parallel.").
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have held that providers have a right of action under Section 1983. For
example, under the analysis of the third circuit in the West Virginia
University Hospital, the first inquiry is whether the Medicaid Act creates
a private right in favor of hospitals participating in a state's medicaid
program. In reviewing the language, purpose, and legislative history of
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A), the court found that the language of the
statute is "cast in the imperative" and "succinctly sets forth a congres-
sional command ... in the direction of providing appropriate reimburse-
ment of hospitals treating medicaid patients." 133 "We believe that
Congress's concern with appropriate hospital remedies implies an intent
to supply hospitals with an indispensable right to enforce state compliance
with federal standards.."134 The court concluded that the beneficiaries of
Section 1983 are hospital providers who have an enforceable private right.
The second concern was whether the Medicaid statute reflected a
congressional intent to foreclose private enforcement. Title XIX gives no
indication that the cut-off of funds to the federal agency is intended to
supplant a Section 1983 remedy. The third circuit held that the remedial
devices contained in the Medicaid Act do not reflect an intent to prohibit
private enforcement of the Boren Amendment.3 5 The states have not been
very successful in challenging this issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
A provider's challenge to a state reimbursement plan or rates may be
premised on procedural or substantive grounds. Under a successful con-
stitutional challenge, the claim is generally of substantive noncompliance
of the state plan with the federal criteria of "reasonable and adequate",
as well as a procedural noncompliance (for example, lack of public notice,
failure to submit adequate assurances). Claims invoking the Equal Pro-
tection Clause frequently pursue a complaint of disparate treatment
based on an economic or social welfare classification. Because state plan
equalization laws are commonly enacted to promote a legitimate state
interest in controlling rates charged by Medicaid participating homes to
private paying residents, an equal protection claim under these laws is
not likely to succeed, unless bolstered by a showing of a decrease in the
quality of patient care or access to services.
Procedural claims based on the inadequacy of assurances or findings
are successful when it can be shown that the state based its assurance
on an intentionally imbalanced interpretation of the data or upon insuf-
ficient findings. Recent decisions indicate the courts may be heading for
a stricter review of state assurances than in the past. Attacks targeted
against reduction of an isolated component of a rate have not generally
131 W. Va. Univ. Hosp., 885 F.2d at 20.
l 4 Id. at 21.
131 Id. at 22.
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been successful. The courts base a determination as to the "reasonableness
and adequacy" of a rate on the total reimbursement rather than an iso-
lated component. Under a tenth circuit ruling, the state agency may rely
on budget constraints in setting its payment rates, but they alone will
not be a sufficient basis upon which to amend a current plan, implement
a new plan, or make annual mandatory findings. Although the federal
circuits have held that 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 confers providers a right
to sue state officials, an upcoming Supreme Court decision will determine
whether providers have a private right to enforce the reimbursement
provisions of the Boren Amendment in federal court. The States, to date
unsuccessful in challenging this issue, are hoping that the Supreme Court
will bail them out with a ruling adverse to the providers.

